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for not less than five years; Pen. Code, §§ 211a, 213) than 
for the crime of assault with a deadly weapon (imprisonment 
in the state prison for not more than 10 years or in the county 
jail for not more than one year, or fine; Pen. Code, § 245), 
the robbery must be considered as the more serious offense 
and the conviction thereof must be affirmed; the conviction 
for the less serious offense must be reversed. (People v. 
Knowles (1950), supra, p. 189 of 35 Cal.2d.) 
For the reasons above stated the order denying the motion 
for a new trial is affirmed; the judgment of conviction of 
assault with a deadly weapon is reversed; and the judgment 
of conviction of robbery is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, 
J., concurred. 
[Crim. No. 5422. In Bank. July 14, 1953.] 
'l'llE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN CHAUNCEY 
LAWRANCE, Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Evidence.-A conviction of first degree murder of 
a 16-year-old girl is sustained by evidence indicating that 
death was not due to fact that automobile in which defendant 
and girl had been riding rolled off the jack which defendant 
was using to change a flat tire and that the jack or jack handle 
slipped and hit girl on head, but was result of a "well directed, 
rather intense" blow; by medical testimony from which it 
could be inferred that an act of sexual intercourse caused a 
hymenal tear and that such act took place at time of or sub-
sequent to girl's death; by defendant's admission that he had 
sexual intercourse with girl; and by evidence of other facts 
of an incriminating nature. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County 
and from an order denying a new trial. John G. Gabbert, 
Judge. Afiirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
death penalty, affirmed. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 106; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 455 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Homicide, § 145(2). 
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William W. Shaw for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Miller, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-This is an automatic appeal (Pen. Code, 
§ 1239) from a judgment of conviction of murder in the first 
degree and from an order denying a motion for a new trial. 
The defendant, John Chauncey Lawrance, was tried by a 
jury, found guilty of murder of the first degree and was 
given the death sentence. The defendant was charged with 
having murdered one Kathryn Wells, also known as Kathryn 
Knodel, a human being, to which charge he pleaded not guilty 
and not guilty by reason of insanity. The plea of not guilty 
by reason of insanity was later withdrawn, and he went to 
trial on the single plea of not guilty. After having been found 
guilty by the jury of the crime, as charged, defendant moved 
for a new trial on all the statutory grounds (Pen. Code, 
§ 1181), which motion was denied. 
The victim, Kathryn Knodel, a girl 16 years of age, lived 
with her mother and stepfather in Redlands. The defendant, 
Kathryn's mother's brother, had been living two or three 
miles from the Knodel home, but had stated, about two or 
three weeks prior to the crime, which occurred on August 19, 
1952, that he was driving to Tennessee for a visit. At the 
time he informed the family that he was going on the trip, 
he owned an old, dented, dirty-looking Dodge car which had 
very little paint remaining on it. He offered at that time to 
give it to Kathryn, but her mother had refused to let her have 
it. Mrs. Knodel and the defendant maintained a close family 
relationship and the defendant often visited the Knodel home. 
On August 19, 1952, Mr. Knodel left for work at 3 :30 p.m.; 
at 5:45 p.m., Mrs. Knodel and the two younger children left 
for a swimming meet in San Bernardino. Kathryn was, at 
that time, watching television and was dressed in white twill 
shorts, a plaid shirt and had her hair tied in a pony tail 
with a piece of red ribbon. Mrs. Knodel told Kathryn that 
she would return home about 9 :30 that evening. When she 
returned, a light was burning in the house, the television was 
turned off, the dishes had been washed and put away and 
Kathryn was not there. Mrs. Knodel thought she heard her 
daughter's laugh from the house next door and was not 
then disturbed about her absence. At midnight, Mrs. Knodel 
picked her husband up at his place of employment and they 
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returned to their home where they had something to eat and 
watched television for a while. At this time, the parents be-
came alarmed at the girl's absence and started searching for 
her at the homes of some of her friends without success. After 
:Mr. Knodel had gone to the police station and had returned 
home, they found a note in Kathryn's writing under Mrs. 
Knodel's purse on the dining room table. 'fhe note read 
":Mom, I will be right back, Kathryn." 
Between 1 and 1 :30 a.m. on August 20th, a Mr. :B~red 
!1acy was driving from Indio to Palm Springs. Before he 
turned off Highway 99 on to Ramon Road, he noticed a bright 
light shining out toward the highway. When he turned on 
Ramon Road, he passed a car with very bright lights coming 
from the direction of Palm Springs. About 200 yards be-
yond the point where he had passed the car, he came upon a 
body lying across the white line of Ramon Road with the head 
to the north and the feet to the south. He did not stop but 
continued to Palm Springs where he reported the matter to 
the police department. The police proceeded to the spot de-
scribed by the witness and found the body of a girl, identi-
fied as Kathryn Knodel, lying across the center line of the 
highway. The body was clad only in a brassiere and plaid 
blouse; it was lying on its back with the arms folded under-
neath. At that time, rigor mortis had begun to set in. 
When the body was removed to the mortuary in Palm 
Springs, it was found to be bloody around the head and neck; 
the hair was thickly matted with blood and foreign matter. 
A tube was inserted in the vagina and specimens of the fluid 
found therein removed; this fluid was slightly reddish in 
color. When embalming was started about an hour later, it 
was found that there was very little force of blood within 
the veins. That afternoon, an autopsy was performed and 
it was determined that death had resulted from an injury 
to the head-a depressed fracture of the skull. On August 
22d, another autopsy was performed upon the body. At 
this time, three groups of wounds were discovered: One group 
which had obviously occurred prior to death; another at about 
the time of death and another group which occurred after 
death. The differentiation as to time when the wounds were 
inflicted was possible because of the bleeding, or lack of 
bleeding about the wounds and the lack of tissue destruction 
due to bacteria. There were six wounds on the top of the 
girl's head, three of them of major significance. All of these 
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wounds had been made by a blunt object and were straight 
wounds, all had been produced prior to death and had hem-
orrhaged into the tissue and around the head. Some of the frag-
ments of the fractured skull had pushed into the brain. It 
was the opinion of the pathologist that the wounds had been 
the result of well directed, rather intense blows. The face 
was badly cut and scratched; the entire left side of the nose 
was badly bruised and contused; there were two fractures 
of the lower jaw; there were teeth marks on the inside of 
the lips and several teeth were missing; there were fresh 
wounds in the gums. No hemorrhage was found in the vicin-
ity of the jaw fractures or around the chin cuts, or around 
the left eyebrow, indicating that these wounds occurred at, 
or very near to the time of death. It was the opinion of the 
pathologist that the facial wounds had been made with a much 
broader object than the wounds on the scalp. The evidence 
showed that the wound on the right back side of the head 
was the most severe; that it was the only single wound which 
could have caused death and that the girl might have sur-
vived had she received medical attention. The balance of 
the body was scratched and bruised. 
An examination of the external genitalia showed no signs 
of violence; the hymenal ring showed a tear 5/8 of an inch 
long and 3/16 of an inch deep, which extended into the 
vulva back of the hymenal ring. There was no evidence of 
hemorrhage in the area in or around the tear and no inflam-
matory cells such as would show a bacterial invasion. From 
this evidence, the pathologists determined that the tear oc-
curred at, or near the time of death. The fluid extracted from 
the vagina was found to contain human spermatozoa. 
With respect to defendant's activities on August 19th and 
thereafter, the evidence showed that on August 19th, at 
about 8 :20 p.m., Olin and Samuel Blacl.:well left Redlands 
to drive to Beaumont. They drove out Highway 99 from 
Redlands and turned west on the Cherry Valley Road; at ap-
proximately 9 :15, they saw on their left, a parked car, with-
out lights, facing west. The car was a dirty, rusted and 
faded 1936 Dodge; a man was sitting on the front seat with 
his left arm on the steering wheel. When the Blackwell 
brothers returned from Beaumont, at about 10 :45 p.m. the 
same night, the Dodge car was still parked where they had 
seen it earlier. They turned their car spotlight on it and 
saw that the back right-hand door of the car was open and 
that it extended over the shoulder of the road. They saw 
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some object lying on the bank close to the right side of the 
car; they saw no one in the car; they saw no flat tires on 
or off the car; they saw no tire jack. They did not stop, but 
continued on their way . 
.At about 11 or 11 :30 p.m. that same night, a 1936 Dodge 
or Plymouth car, badly in need of paint, was seen at Garnet 
in Riverside County. It was stuck on the railroad tracks 
and a signal maintainer and a fireman jacked up the wheels 
of the car and put blocks under them. The defendant was 
present, but did not assist. When the wheels were up, the 
defendant got in the car and moved it backward off the 
tracks. Defendant turned the car lights off and drove it 
between the tracks and a siding to a spot in the vicinity of 
a faucet where he parked. Defendant then got out of the car 
and walked to the west; when a train came by, defendant 
got back in the car and sat there until the train had passed. 
He then got out of the car and opened the rear door. When 
next seen, he was closing the door after which he again walked 
to the west; he returned to the car which he drove back to 
the road, crossing the tracks in a northerly direction turning 
on the lights as he did so. 
Defendant called his sister, Kathryn's mother, in Redlands 
about .August 21st from San Francisco at about 11 o'clock 
at night. He testified that he had read about the girl's 
death in the papers; that his wife in San Rafael had told 
him the police were looking for him. Mrs. Knodel testified 
that she advised him to give himself up to the police. De-
fendant told the San Francisco police several different stories 
as to his whereabouts at the time of the crime. Later, he 
told the Redlands, Riverside and San Bernardino officers 
another story. He was taken from San Francisco to San 
Bernardino county and his car was taken by truck to a River-
side garage. His story was, finally, that he had stopped at 
his sister's home in Redlands at about 9 :15 p.m. on .August 
19th; that Kathryn was there alone and that they had gone 
for a drive in his car for the purpose of having sexual inter-
course which they had engaged in twice prior to the night 
in question. He stated that after they had parked, where 
the car was seen, they had intercourse; that she had then 
cleansed herself with a handkerchief and some water from a 
bottle in his car; that he noticed he had a flat tire on his 
right rear wheel and that he got out a jack with which to 
change the tire. He said that Kathryn was squatting on her 
heels just behind him and that the car rolled off the jack 
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and that the jack, or jack handle, slipped and hit her on 
the head. He said he noticed a car approaching and that 
he put her on the side of the road to get her out of sight 
but that she slipped over the bank; that he went after her 
but she was dead when he got to her; that he hit her with a 
rock a ha1f dozen times to make it look like a hit-run acci-
dent; that he had taken off her panties and shorts and thrown 
them away. In another story, he told officers he had sexual 
relations twice with the girl-once before her death, and 
once thereafter in order to make it look like a rape case. He 
testified that after she had been hit with the jack handle, 
she fell and when he tried to lift her he found she had blood 
all over her; that he tried to stop the bleeding with a piece 
of inner tube around her head; that he didn't know where 
he got the tube; that as a car approached, he tried to get 
her out of sight; that she fell over the embankment and he 
fell, too; that he tried to get her back to the road but that 
she kept falling down causing him to fall also. He said 
that he left her in the gully, changed the tire, using a differ-
ent jack, after blocking the front of the car with a rock he 
had found in the gully. He testified that when the tire was 
changed, he put the jack in the back of the car, threw the 
rock over the hill and went back after the girl whom he be-
lieved to be dead ; that he did not have sexual relations with 
her then; that he did not deliberately hit her with any rocks; 
that it was then he decided tc make it look like a case of rape 
so he removed her clothing. He said he finally succeeded 
in getting her up the hill and put her in the back of his car 
so he could move her to a place where she would be found. 
He picked up the rock which he had used to block the front 
of the car because he thought it might have blood on it; that 
he threw it into the back of the car where the girl lay and 
later took it out of his car and threw it into a field. He stated 
that later he got stuek on some railroad tracks; that he put 
on clean clothes whieh he had in the back seat of the car 
because the others had blood on them; that he felt a train 
was coming and took the body out of the car and dragged 
it about 30 feet from the tracks; that later he went back and 
got the body and pnt it back in the car. He said he washed 
off the blood on his hands and face at the water hydrant 
there and that he then drove to the spot where the body was 
later found. He said that he put the girl in the road and 
crossed her arms over her breast. He testified that he waited 
until he saw a car going toward Indio from what he thought 
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was the direction of Redlands; that it made a right turn on 
the road; that he then left and drove westward on Highway 
99 ; that he stopped some place beyond the ''vineyard area'' 
and took everything out of the car and washed it out, tires, 
tools, and car; that he disposed of the jacks and tires in San 
Francisco before going to the police station. Four days after 
the body was found, a dark spot (identified as a blood spot) 
was found where the 1936 Dodge car had been seen parked; 
there were also stains on the road which could have been 
caused by water leaking from a car radiator parked with its 
front end toward the blood spot. There were what appeared 
to be drag marks from the dark spots down a 21-foot em-
bankment at the side of the road; at the base of the bank 
were more blood spots and the dirt and debris at the base 
of a tree at the bottom of the embankment was heavily con-
taminated with human blood and with hair which matched that 
of the dead girl. The same kind of hair was found in the 
dark spot on the road. A 30-pound rock, found 3 miles 
from the bloodstain on the road, was found to be contami-
nated with human blood in a number of places and three eye-
brow or eyelash hairs were also found there. It was the 
opinion of the pathologist that the facial wounds could have 
been caused by such a rock. Bloodstains and drag marks 
were also found at the Garnet railroad crossing where de-
fendant had been seen getting in and out of his car as here-
tofore related. 
[1] Defendant's only contention is that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the judgment. It is contended that 
the first doctor who examined the body was unable to find 
any evidence that the girl had been criminally assaulted. 
Dr. Stephen's testimony is not susceptible of such an inter-
pretation. His testimony showefl that he was an internist, 
not a pathologist and that he was "working for the Coroner 
to determine what her cause of death was''; that he did an 
incomplete post-mortem examination; that he might, or might 
not, have bisected the uterus; that he made no examination 
of the vagina or of the hymenal ring; that he did nothing in 
his examination that could possibly have torn the hymenal 
ring; that he had taken a "wiping" from the very top of the 
vagina to see if it contained spermatozoa; that (in answer 
to the question of criminal assault) "I did not find anything 
in the examination, I would say it was so unsatisfactory, the 
examination, I would say because for a specimen being dried 
298 PEOPLE v. LAWRANCE [41 C.2d 
out because I would put no emphasis on it one way or the 
other." Dr. Roos, the pathologist who later did a complete 
autopsy, testified that the uterus had not been previously 
opened; that he discovered no evidence of pregnancy or of 
menstruation. In this regard, it is contended that the reddish 
condition of the fluid withdrawn from the vagina indicates 
the presence of blood; that a reasonable inference to be drawn 
from this evidence is that the hymenal rupture was caused 
prior to death, or that it might have been caused when the 
fluid was withdrawn at the mortuary. It is also argued that 
the few spermatozoa found by Dr. Roos, the clean outer con-
dition of the external genitalia, and the lack of evidence of 
external injury in that area, all lead to the conclusion that 
intercourse took place prior to death and was voluntary on 
the part of the deceased. The vaginal fluid withdrawn prior 
to either autopsy was found to contain human spermatozoa. 
Dr. Roos testified that he found one spermatozoon, portions 
of others and a pubic hair but that this was not surprising 
inasmuch as spermatozoa disintegrated rapidly in the presence 
of bacteria; that there was absolutely no hemorrhage in the 
hymenal tear, and no inflammatory cells; that he could reach 
"no other conclusion" than that the tear occurred at the 
time the girl died, or afterwards. He testified that the tear 
did not occur while she was living and with normal blood 
pressure because if it had there would have been evidence 
of bleeding into the surrounding tissue. He explained that 
a wound which occurred after death might ooze blood into 
the cut but not into the tissue around the wound; that the 
presence of blood in the vaginal fluid would have no signi-
ficance so far as the time when the vaginal tear occurred. 
There is no merit to defendant's contention that the hymenal 
tear was caused by the mortician's assistant who inserted the 
tube to withdraw the fluid from the vagina. Dr. Roos testi-
fied that the insertion of a small, blunt tube could not cause 
the kind of tear found in the dead girl's body. It was 
within the jury's province to believe, as it did, the testimony 
of Dr. Roos and to infer, as it did, that the act of sexual 
intercourse caused the tear and that the act took place at the 
time of, or subsequent to, the death of the victim. 
Defendant contends that Mr. Blackwell, when he visited 
the spot where he had seen defendant's car parked on the 
night of .August 19th, had seen the blood spot and had said 
it was to the rear of the spot where he had seen the car 
parked on the night in question. This evidence, it is con-
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tended, supports the defendant's story that the girl was 
accidentally struck by the jack, or jack handle, as he was 
changing the tire. Another fact relied upon by defendant 
is that the water spots on the highway contained rust, while 
that which leaked from the radiator of his car while in the 
Riverside garage was oily with only a small amount of rust. 
Defendant also makes much of the fact that the testimony 
of Mr. Pinker, the chemical expert of the Los Angeles Police 
Department, to the effect that there were no scratches on 
the underside of the right rear bumper, also showed that in 
making the test the carbon had not been removed therefrom. 
In this regard, it is contended that since defendant, after 
allegedly jacking up the right rear bumper, had driven to 
San Francisco, the underside of the bumper would be cov-
ered with carbon which would obliterate the jack marks. It 
is noted that the expert testified that there were scratch 
marks on the outside of the right rear bumper. Mr. Pinker 
testified that these outer scratch marks were such as might 
have been made by the bumper of another car striking the 
bumper of the car in question. 
Defendant's contentions with respect to the testimony of 
the witness Blackwell that the blood spot was approximately 
2 feet from the rear of the car as he remembered seeing it 
on the night in question, the content of the water spots on 
the highway as compared to the water content of that which 
leaked from his car, as well as the carbon-covered condition 
of the underside of the right rear bumper on his car, all 
appear to be without materiality in view of the evidence. 
The expert medical testimony was to the effect that the one 
single blow on the girl's head which could have, of itself, 
caused death, was the result of a "well directed, rather in-
tense" blow. This statement, together with the fact that 
she was struck six blows upon the head, which the evidence 
showed were made by the same instrument, was sufficient 
evidence from which the jury could have inferred that the 
killing was not accidental. Except for the intentional, as 
distinguished from accidental, nature of the blows, the de-
fendant's story and the evidence are corroborative one of 
the other. 
rrhe medical testimony is sufficient to support the jury's 
impliPd finding that the act of sexual intercourse took place 
ut the time of, or after, the girl's death. Section 189 of the 
Penal Code provides that all murder which is committed in 
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, rape, is murder 
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of the first degree. The record here affords substantial sup-
port for the conclusion that the homicide was committed 
in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, rape (People 
v. Lindley, 26 Cal.2d 780 [161 P.2d 227]; People v. Gutierrez, 
35 Cal.2d 721 [221 P.2d 22]). 
Defendant makes veiled assertions that the testimony given 
by the forensic chemist and the pathologist was so positive 
and assured as to be unreliable. This contention is without 
merit. Defendant made no objection as to the admissibility 
of their opinions, and was, furthermore, given ample oppor-
tunity to cross-examine both witnesses. 
A reading of the record in this case discloses that defend-
ant's rights and interests were fully protected by his counsel 
and by the court and that he was accorded a fair and im-
partial trial in all respects. 
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are, and 
each of them is, affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 22363. In Bank. July 28, 1953.] 
JOHN DOE HERRSCHER, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and 
Respondent, v. EDMOND E. HERRSCHER, Appel-
lant; ANN JACKSON, Cross-defendant and Respondent. 
[1] Appeal-Decisions Appealable-Finality-Collateral Matters. 
-Order granting motion to strike cross-complaint from files is 
equivalent to order dismissing cross-complaint, and where 
parties to cross-complaint are not identical with parties to 
original action the order amounts to a final adjudication be-
tween cross-complainants and cross-defendants and is appeal-
able. 
[2] !d.-Decisions Appealable-Dismissal.-Order of dismissal is 
to be treated as a judgment for purposes of taking an appeal 
when it finally disposes of particular action and prevents fur-
ther proceedings as effectually as would any formal judgment. 
[3] !d.-Decisions Appealable-Finality-Further Orders Neces-
sary.-Where findings of fact or a further or formal order is 
required, an appeal does not lie from a minute order. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 42. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 32; [2] Appeal 
and Error,§ 44; [3, 6] Appeal and Error,§ 31; [4, 7] Appeal and 
Error,§ 249; [5] Appeal and Error, § 259. 
